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Mission-led business: CSR re-boot or paradigm shift? 
David Hunter and Nina Boeger1 
 November 2017 
Summary 
Businesses are like cement. Both are an integral part of the society we inhabit and yet, for the most 
part, barely visible to us as tangible entities. We give them little thought, but our lives would be very 
different were we to wake up to a world without either. In April 2016, the UK government did invite 
us to think about the nature of business though, as part of what it called a review of ‘mission-led 
business’. It set up an advisory panel and ran a public consultation and, seven months on, the panel 
reported to the government with its recommendations. In this essay, David Hunter and Nina Boeger 
consider the review’s implications against a backdrop of ongoing political and economic turmoil in 
the UK and beyond, and a climate marked by an ever-diminishing trust in the governance of our 
mainstream corporations. Many recognise that ‘business as usual’ is not an option for corporate 
governance in the 21st century. But does the review point towards a wider paradigm shift, a 
movement towards more responsible and sustainable business governance, or simply a re-booting of 
the well-rehearsed (business) case for greater ‘corporate social responsibility’? The authors examine 
the arguments and make a number of suggestions; amongst them, a proposal that would see the 
development of a new legal form – a stakeholder company – that is tailored to the needs of mission-
led businesses to support their growth.  
1. Introduction 
Competition is at the core of capitalism, but the effects of so-called free market capitalism over the 
last thirty years and particularly since 2010 have been to suppress true competition in many 
respects. Rent-seeking2 has been rewarded rather than labour, markets are dominated by 
oligopolistic multinationals and pricing has become increasingly opaque. Over time, the impact of 
these distortions has escalated, such that even many proponents of capitalism see the threat it is 
now posing to itself if it continues unchecked. The pursuit by corporations of profit maximisation as 
the overriding goal and the short termism encouraged by measuring this on a quarterly basis have 
been identified as drivers of these problems.3  
                                                          
1 David Hunter is a consultant solicitor at Bates Wells Braithwaite LLP and a Knowledge Exchange Fellow at the 
University of Bristol Law School. Nina Boeger is Senior Lecturer in Law and Director of the Centre for Law and 
Enterprise at the University of Bristol Law School. We are grateful to the University of Bristol and to Policy 
Bristol for enabling this research through the support of an ESRC Knowledge Exchange Fellowship. David 
Hunter is writing in a purely personal capacity as researcher. None of the arguments in this essay should be 
attributed to Bates Wells Braithwaite LLP. Note: all online resources have been last accessed on 20 November 
2017.  
2 P. Frase, Four Futures: life after capitalism (Verso, 2016)   
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Explicitly embedding the social and environmental mission of a business into its governing document 
and then reporting performance against this regularly has been suggested as a potential solution to, 
or amelioration of at least, these issues. This was one of the recommendations of an advisory panel 
set up by the UK government in 2016 to review mission-led business.4 It was also one of the 
proposals in the policy report of the Big Innovation Centre on The Purposeful Company published in 
February 2017.5 The UK government has acknowledged this as an issue meriting attention. Prime 
Minister Theresa May has spoken more than once of her intent to establish a more inclusive 
economy and a fairer society6 and her government has published not one, but two Green Papers on 
the theme of corporate governance,7along with a response flowing from those consultations8. 
Britain’s departure from the European Union, the geopolitical tremors induced by the United States’ 
choice of President and the Prime Minister’s own vulnerability following the 2017 general election 
may combine to deflect that attention, but it remains a matter of economic and cultural significance, 
to the country and beyond. 
Our objective in this paper is to engage critically with these developments, but also to consider how, 
particularly in our role as lawyers, we may contribute practical solutions and proposals for 
implementing some of the key changes in our corporate (legal) landscape that some of these recent 
policy initiatives point towards. To that end, we concentrate our discussion on the mission-led 
business review (the Review) as an initiative that encouraged concrete recommendations for 
change. In April 2016, the UK government initiated the Review by setting out three broad objectives. 
First, it sought to gather data on the role of mission-led businesses in the economy, establishing how 
big a part of the economy this sector is, and what barriers to growth exist. Secondly, it aimed to 
generate a ‘vision’ that would shape the potential role of these businesses in the UK economy. 
Finally, the review encouraged the development of concrete recommendations on what industry 
and government might do to better support mission-led businesses.9  
                                                          
4 On a Mission in the UK Economy: Current state of play, vision and recommendations from the advisory panel 
to the Mission-led Business Review 2016, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/574694/Advisory_Panel_Re
port_-_Mission-led_Business.pdf 
5 Big Innovation Centre, The Purposeful Company Policy Report, February 2017, available at:  
http://biginnovationcentre.com/media/uploads/pdf/TPC_Policy%20Report.pdf  
6 Cf. for example, https://www.pioneerspost.com/news-views/20161011/new-inclusive-economy-unit-
created-british-government and https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-shared-society-article-by-
theresa-may 
7 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Corporate Governance Reform Green Paper’, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/584013/corporate-
governance-reform-green-paper.pdf and H M Government, ‘Building Our Industrial Strategy’, 
https://beisgovuk.citizenspace.com/strategy/industrial-
strategy/supporting_documents/buildingourindustrialstrategygreenpaper.pdf 
8 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Corporate Governance Reform: The Government 
response to the green paper consultation’, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/640631/corporate-
governance-reform-government-response.pdf  
9 H M Government, Cabinet Office, ‘Mission-led Business Review: Call for Evidence’, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/521927/Mission-
Led_Business_Review-Call_for_Evidence.PDF p. 2 
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The government set up an advisory panel and ran a public consultation and, seven months on, the 
panel reported back to the government with its recommendations.10 The timing of this process is 
interesting. The Review commenced when David Cameron was still Prime Minister, before the UK’s 
Referendum on EU membership and the 2016 US election, but the publication of the panel’s findings 
came after those events had demonstrated a clear sense of public discontent with the status quo.  
Notable, too, is the composition of the panel itself. Having described mission-led business as a 
‘particular part of the social economy’ in its call for evidence11, we might have expected the 
government to invite onto the advisory panel some key players in the social economy, from existing 
social or cooperative enterprises. Instead, it selected a group of ten industry experts, many of them 
with affiliations to mainstream commercial businesses including some large household names.  
This highlights a tension that marked the Review’s scope and design from the outset, raising the 
question of what actually was under review and why. The composition of the panel suggested not 
only that its focus was not the established social economy, but that there was not much to learn 
from it. The brief that came from the Minister of Civil Society clearly suggested that its focus would 
be on the development of mission-led business as an emergent form in the social economy – in 
other words, on new ways for ‘transitional’ companies to operate with an increased emphasis on 
social mission.  As we shall see, the panel itself presented an ambitious vision for mission-led 
business and its relevance for the general economy. The government, however, has not yet given 
any clear signal as to whether it is prepared to take some of the more ambitious recommendations 
forward in a substantive way. The only explicit reference to the Review in the government response 
to the Green Paper consultations was: ‘This reform package will complement wider work that the 
Government and others are undertaking to enhance public trust in business as a force for good and 
encourage corporate responsibility. This includes follow-up to the review of “mission-led” businesses 
(including work to encourage business with purpose and a prospective new business-civil society 
collaboration).’12 The authors understand this work is proceeding in Whitehall, but it is something 
the government does not appear minded to shout about.   
Our discussion of the Review, and some of these wider critical issues, proceeds as follows. In section 
2, we briefly consider the unresolved issues in corporate governance, and underlying problems with 
capitalism, that many identify as lying at the heart of our current economic and political crises. 
These, we point out, are not new challenges but they are coming at us today with increasing urgency 
and provide the context for the Review and the various related initiatives currently progressing,13 
and for this paper. Section 3 introduces the concept of mission-led business and its implications for 
corporate governance, providing the basis for our critical analysis in section 4. Here, we trace some 
                                                          
10 Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, Press Release, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/building-a-country-that-works-for-everyone-independent-panel-
publishes-report-on-putting-values-at-the-heart-of-our-businesses  
11 H M Government, Cabinet Office, ‘Mission-led Business Review: Call for Evidence’, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/521927/Mission-
Led_Business_Review-Call_for_Evidence.PDF p. 2 
12 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Corporate Governance Reform: The Government 
response to the green paper consultation’, p. 8 available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/640631/corporate-
governance-reform-government-response.pdf  
13 E.g. www.bcorporation.uk; http://www.blueprintforbusiness.org/; 
http://www.biginnovationcentre.com/purposeful-company; http://www.aldersgategroup.org.uk/ 
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of the sceptical arguments raised by, amongst others, existing social enterprises, sometimes with 
long-standing experience in the social economy. Some of these point out that the Review’s focus on 
business with purpose as a ‘competitive advantage’ is reminiscent of the well-established but, 
arguably, only marginally impactful CSR agenda that has allowed corporations to present themselves 
as good corporate citizens while continuing to focus on shareholders’ financial to the detriment of 
other stakeholders.  
Section 5, in contrast, highlights that the mission-led business agenda and other, similar 
contributions to the corporate governance debate, do seem to be pointing to an appetite for more 
substantive change which, depending upon how deep and wide this is, could lead to a potential 
paradigm shift. Sections 6 and 7 address questions of corporate legal form. While in section 6 we 
look at existing legal forms for mission-led businesses and social enterprises, in section 7 we offer a 
number of suggestions that would see the introduction of a new legal form with particular 
requirements regarding directors’ duties, corporate purpose and reporting, that would allow 
mission-led businesses to set themselves apart from other mainstream companies. Section 8 
acknowledges, echoing the advisory panel’s approach, that legal reform cannot be seen in isolation. 
The likelihood of mission-led business becoming realised in a manner that has significant impact 
depends on many factors and involves many participants, including financial markets, corporate 
executives, their advisers and the government as well as research and academia. In section 9 we 
provide a brief conclusion and outlook.   
2. Problems with corporate governance and capitalism 
Concerns with corporate governance in the UK are not new. In the early 1990s, the Cadbury 
Committee was established at a time when the sudden collapses of Asil Nadir’s Polly Peck, the Bank 
of Credit and Commerce International and the Maxwell Group had created widespread discontent 
and distrust in corporate practices.14 1995 saw the Greenbury Report15 on directors’ remuneration in 
response to the public perception of executives of large corporations as ‘fat cats’ looking after 
‘number one’. Corporate governance was touched on again as part of the 2012 Kay Review of UK 
Equity Markets,16 commissioned in response to the financial crash of 2008. What regulation has 
flowed from these reviews may have changed market practices to some degree, but clearly has not 
made those concerns go away.17 
In fact, the post-crisis period has only magnified them as corporate irresponsibility and its 
deleterious effects appear to be ‘scaling new heights’, as Paddy Ireland remarks.18 There is a 
widespread sense that business has lost the trust of the general public in the UK and beyond, as 
evidenced by the latest Edelman Trust Barometer.19 It is easy to see how this has come about with 
                                                          
14 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (The ‘Cadbury Report’), 1 
December 1992, available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf 
15 Directors’ Remuneration: Report of a Study Group chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury, 17 July 1995, available 
at: https://www.scribd.com/document/235133276/Greenbury-Report-1995-enhanced-version  
16 The Kay Review, above note 3  
17 See further N. Boeger and C. Villiers, ‘Introduction’, in idem (eds.), Shaping the Corporate Landscape: 
towards corporate reform and enterprise diversity (Hart, 2018, in press)  
18 P. Ireland, ‘Corporate Schizophrenia: the institutional origins of corporate social irresponsibility’ in N. Boeger 
and C. Villiers, (eds.), Shaping the Corporate Landscape: towards corporate reform and enterprise diversity 
(Hart, 2018, in press) 
19 2017 Edelman Trust Barometer, available at: https://www.edelman.com/trust2017/  
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the litany of corporate malpractices that include banks fraudulently selling payment protection 
insurance to their customers; supermarkets passing off horsemeat as other forms of food; 
Volkswagen engineering fake emissions figures; and the likes of Philip Green and Mike Ashley 
displaying contemptuous disregard for the effects of their actions on their employees. Such practices 
are offensive enough in themselves, but the way they have been received has been compounded by 
the lack of accountability in each case. The banks pay eye-watering fines without blinking; the 
supermarkets blame their supply chains (notwithstanding in most other respects they seem to exert 
draconian control over how those same supply chains operate); Volkswagen grudgingly apply a 
dilatory ‘fix’ to their polluting vehicles; and Green and Ashley continue to enjoy their millions. Little 
appears to change, embedding a culture of ‘getting away with it’ (or trying to) and the 
irresponsibility Ireland identifies.  
The lack of trust in corporations and their governance intersects with a growing distrust too in the 
underpinning capitalist market system. It is rooted in the sense - and a sense, notably, beginning to 
be voiced by its erstwhile advocates - that capitalism is no longer an inevitable solution to the 
world’s economic challenges, but may rather itself be part of the problem. The benefits of 
competition are no longer being felt as markets are dominated by a handful of mega-corporations; 
inequalities are escalating as the super-rich amass wealth whilst workers’ wages stagnate; and the 
demands of perpetual economic growth drive consumption to levels that exacerbate climate change 
and resource depletion, creating dangerous positive feedback loops. To an increasing extent, the 
human element has been eroded from the economy, as data, algorithms and automation are relied 
upon to ‘improve the numbers’ for businesses.  
The intersection of both debates – on corporate reform and on economic reform – provides the 
context for the Review. Those who call out the current economic system for its flaws, also often 
highlight the shortcomings of our dominant corporate governance framework, whose underpinning 
liberal economic theory (foremost, the focus on shareholder value as a driver for economic 
efficiency) is a manifestation of that system. Some cheerleaders of capitalism are astute enough to 
recognise that it is not a perfect system, although they are committed to it as being the optimal one 
available. They recognise fine tuning of the current model is necessary to prevent the escalation of 
problems seen in recent years, undermining future support for (and indeed the functioning of) 
capitalism as we have come to know it. There is an ideological impetus that sees that pursuit of 
profits to the exclusion of all else is ultimately self-defeating and that this needs to be moderated to 
avoid capitalism sowing the seeds of its own collapse. Purpose potentially provides that moderating 
effect. Partly, at least, this would seem to be behind the government’s engagement with the issue 
since Theresa May came to office. 
It is also interesting to note the echoes of her stance in recent UK political history. In 1996, as part of 
his push to become Prime Minister, Tony Blair was talking of ‘stakeholder capitalism’; Gordon Brown 
put co-operative and mutual ideals at the heart of his 2010 manifesto; David Cameron, as Prime 
Minister in 2102 spoke of a ‘popular capitalism’ while his own business secretary, Vince Cable, 
preferred ‘progressive capitalism’ and the then Leader of the Opposition, Ed Miliband, was 
advocating ‘responsible capitalism’. It is clear from this that, politically, there is a broad recognition 
that some moderation of capitalism is desirable. It is even clearer that to date there has been a lack 
of confidence and leadership necessary to translate words into actions in any meaningful way on this 
issue. The sense is the politicians are more interested in tuning into and following the zeitgeist, 
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rather than driving it. This does not mean that they will not play an important role in effecting 
change, but the impetus for it is likely to come from elsewhere. 
3. What is mission-led business? 
Phrases such as ‘doing well by doing good’20, ‘business as a force for good’21, responsible 
capitalism22, inclusive capitalism23 and, most recently, the ‘inclusive economy’24 all point to a 
growing recognition from elements of the mainstream commercial, financial and political spheres 
that there is more to being a successful business than maximising the bottom line at any cost. The 
principles behind these ideas are certainly not new; some of them reach back decades.25 Our 
interest here lies in how the Review, by introducing a focus on mission-led business as a specific 
concept, creates an opportunity to engage meaningfully with what these principles could mean in 
practice now.  
The advisory panel begin their report on the Review with a definition of mission-led businesses as 
‘profit-driven businesses that make a powerful commitment to social impact’ and that serve an 
‘ethos to contribute to society through their operations, goods and services.’26 In addition, the panel 
set out three specific characteristics of mission-led businesses namely, first, a commitment to 
transparently delivering a positive social and environmental impact; secondly, an understanding that 
parties beyond shareholders have a legitimate interest in outcomes of the business; and thirdly, a 
recognition that value can be delivered sustainably by broader engagement with stakeholders.27   
The panel’s understanding of mission-led businesses broadly mirrors what Brakman Reiser terms a 
‘dual mission’ enterprises.28 On the one hand, they are committed to making and distributing profits 
for their shareholders to satisfy their need for capital investment. The latter – the freedom to 
distribute profits – is what in principle distinguishes mission-led business from social enterprises as 
they are conceived in the wider UK policy context, (being firms that reinvest most of their profits 
back into their business for a social purpose). It suggests that mission-led businesses are more 
commercially oriented, and less likely than social enterprises to accept constraints on, for example, 
their ability to declare dividends or access loan finance.  
                                                          
20 McKinsey, Doing well by Doing Good: a leaders’ guide, September 2013, available at: 
http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/social-sector/our-insights/doing-well-by-doing-good-a-leaders-guide  
21 A Blueprint for Better Business, at: http://www.blueprintforbusiness.org/  
22 E. Miliband, ‘What responsible capitalism is all above’, The Guardian, 22 May 2013, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/22/google-corporate-responsibility-ed-miliband-
speech  
23 Coalition for Inclusive Capitalism, at: http://www.inc-cap.com/  
24 United Nations Development Programme, at: 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/blog/2015/7/31/What-does-inclusive-economic-growth-
actually-mean-in-practice-.html; Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, Press Release: ‘Government 
announces Inclusive Economy Unit’, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-
announces-inclusive-economy-unit  
25 E.g. E. F. Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered (Vintage, 1993 
(originally 1973)); P. Hawken, The Ecology of Commerce: A Declaration of Sustainability (Revised Edition, 
Harper Business, 2010); J. Elkington, J. Cannibals with Forks: The Triple Bottom Line of 21st Century Business 
(Capstone, 1999); J. Porritt, Capitalism as if the world matters, (Earthscan, 2005)  
26 On a Mission in the UK Economy, above note 4, p. 8 
27 Ibid. 
28 D. Brakman Reiser, ‘Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission Dilemma’, (2011) 35 Vermont Law Review 105-
116 
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However, reflecting the other side of their ‘dual mission’, these businesses are also committed to 
social impact and in this respect, they are categorically different from traditional corporate 
businesses that are run for shareholder value. At its heart, mission-led business signifies a shift from 
the supremacy of shareholder interest, and the quarterly measurement of how this is delivered in 
financial terms, to a more balanced assessment of the impact of a business’ activities across its 
stakeholders, assessed in the medium to long term. A non-exclusive list of such stakeholders will 
typically include (in addition to, not instead of, but alongside the shareholders) staff, customers, 
suppliers, investors, the communities in which the business operates, the environment it relies 
upon, the state that guarantees stable conditions in which to exist and future generations, who may 
determine the longevity of the business. The common thread among each of these stakeholders, of 
course, is that they are people, grouped in various ways or, in the case of the environment, 
something essential for the health and wellbeing of people. Thus mission led business necessitates 
engagement with the impact of a company on people, rather than merely share price, as a measure 
of success. 
4. A CSR re-boot? 
The philosophical distinction around the application of surpluses generated by the business explains 
many of the reservations that some in the social enterprise world have with the mission-led business 
concept. They point in particular to the advent of corporate social responsibility (CSR), which started 
out from similar principles of recognising the external impacts of commercial organisations, but has 
often been diverted into an activity for the marketing department and has led to accusations of 
‘greenwash’.29 Despite what may have been good initial intentions – and pockets of good corporate 
practice – the general perception of CSR is of a marginal activity regarded as supporting branding 
and communications, rather than something culturally fundamental to businesses. The concern is 
mission-led business will just be the next iteration of this, perhaps more dangerous if it is given 
legislative legitimacy, and providing a further shield of apparent benign intent behind which 
corporates continue ‘business as usual’ (which, after all, has been one of the more ubiquitous 
mantras in the post-crash economy). 
Others, particularly some who have worked tirelessly to build the social enterprise and social 
investment sectors over the last twenty years are concerned that, over time, even if businesses are 
set up with the best intentions, when conflicts between purpose and profit inevitably arise, those 
owning and running them are likely to default to a position where they give greater weight to the 
latter. However, they will still have the benefit of the perception of being ‘good businesses’. 
Meanwhile, truly non-profit distributing (or restricted profit distribution) enterprises may well find 
attracting finance increasingly difficult and the market conditions perhaps even tougher, 
notwithstanding they are the best placed to claim to be genuinely mission-led. 
The panel’s own framing of mission-led business has fanned some of these concerns. It very clearly 
roots mission-led business in the existing economic paradigm of this being a pragmatic way to 
achieve commercial success and, specifically, greater and speedier growth in an increasingly 
uncertain, complex world. This is evident in the language of its report, where the panel talks of 
mission-led businesses making ‘a significant contribution to UK growth over the next ten years’, and 
                                                          
29 N. Boeger, R. Murray and C. Villiers (eds.), Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility (Edward Elgar, 
2008); P. Fleming and M. T. Jones, The End of Corporate Social Responsibility: Crisis and Critique (Sage, 2013) 
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such businesses being ‘primed for success’.30 Referencing various reports that highlight the 
interconnection between corporate growth and social impact (and between financial and social 
value), the panel states there is growing evidence that taking this approach gives businesses a 
competitive advantage through improved performance, increased staff retention and greater 
customer loyalty.31 Whilst it may be the case that this language is used with the intent of ‘not scaring 
the horses’ and to secure engagement from the mainstream corporate community, it brings with it 
the danger that the underlying culture remains unaffected and the changes introduced are regarded 
as matters of compliance and CSR branding still.  
The advisory panel does draw a distinction between CSR and the mission-led business agenda, 
stating the latter promotes businesses that have social impact or value hardwired into their 
constitution and governance model, whereas the form considers these matters as part of a voluntary 
corporate (marketing) policy. Referencing a report from Deloitte, the panel acknowledges that 
businesses are moving away from an ‘“offset” model with specific resources allocated to [CSR], to a 
broader agenda under which social impact is integrated across the business and seen as driver for 
value.’32 Yet as much as the panel reassures us of a move beyond CSR, its framing and the language 
it deploys are strikingly similar to those that have come to define CSR. The focus is primarily on the 
commercial opportunity in anticipating the pendulum swinging back to a more socially responsible 
form of business operation. This is purpose as business case; a means to be more successful as a 
company, as measured by the established metrics. It is not an isolated view but one shared 
increasingly through fora such as the Aldersgate Group33, Blueprint for a Better Business34 or The 
Purposeful Company.35 Like the advisory panel itself, these institutions all contain individuals who 
are, reassuringly for the mainstream, serious and successful capitalists.  
Referencing Deloitte, the panel states that there are currently around 123,000 UK mission-led 
businesses, which have a combined turnover of £165 billion and employ 1.4 million people.36 These 
might be surprising numbers given this is a new concept for many people. Many may be surprised, 
too, by the belief espoused by the advisory panel that ‘by 2026 all UK businesses will have a mission 
that includes serving society and the environment. The most successful businesses will be those that 
manifestly deliver on that mission.’37 Some may focus on the undeniable ambition of the word ‘all’. 
Others may point out that ‘includes’ could cover a vast spectrum of intent, not all of it benign to all 
stakeholders. Yet others may remark that the presentation of flexible and broad ambitions with a 
promise of more responsible business practices is exactly what we have seen for decades with CSR, 
with little tangible impact. 
                                                          
30 On a Mission in the UK Economy, above note 4, p. 3  
31 Ibid., p. 5 
32 Ibid., p. 9 
33 Aldersgate Group: Leaders for a sustainable economy, at http://www.aldersgategroup.org.uk/  
34 A Blueprint for Better Business, at: http://www.blueprintforbusiness.org/  
35 Big Innovation Centre: The Purposeful Company, at: http://www.biginnovationcentre.com/purposeful-
company . The Purposeful Company Task Force for example frame the rationale for nurturing purposeful 
companies to be ‘so that the UK can deliver the productivity growth on which living standards across all 
regions depend.’ See Big Innovation Centre, The Purposeful Company Policy Report, above note 5, p. 6  
36 On a Mission in the UK Economy, above note 4, p. 10 
37 Ibid., p. 31 
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5. A paradigm-shift? 
Looking through a more optimistic lens, a desire for change in corporate practice evidently exists 
among a variety of diverse constituencies. The panel observe ‘a new social contract developing 
between business and society, in which businesses engage with stakeholders beyond their current 
narrow remit to create benefits for employees, citizens and society at large.’38 It is on the back of 
this social contract that the panel present their ambitious vision foreseeing that in the next decade, 
all UK businesses will be incorporating a social mission into their corporate governance.39 In fact, as 
the panel observes quite rightly, these are debates that clearly ‘go beyond the initial remit of the 
Review.’40 
This suggests that something more than a rebranding of the CSR moniker is going on, and there exits 
an opportunity for approaches in corporate governance to drive change in more fundamental ways. 
A genuine balancing of stakeholder interests on a habitual basis, across a sizeable proportion of the 
business community, would mean over time greater weight being given to social and environmental 
issues to a degree which could have a profound effect, not just in commercial terms but culturally 
also, as attitudes and behaviours change not just in the board rooms, but with those that are 
affected by them. This is perhaps a more ambitious vision of what may emerge from the observation 
of the panel that mission-led businesses today ‘operate across diverse markets and sectors and it is 
hard to describe them as a stand-alone sector in the economy.’41 
Mission-led businesses may be regarded, we have seen, as being ‘profit with purpose’ entities, 
distinct from traditional social enterprises which are ‘profit for purpose’; the difference in emphasis 
being that the former have no qualms about levels of profit earned and private benefit arising from 
that, provided it is a by-product of delivering the corporate mission, whereas the latter recycle any 
profits to increase their purposeful impact. Despite certain reservations, many in this space would 
recognise that diluting the emphasis on shareholder profit and a greater focus on stakeholder 
interests has the potential to have a positive societal impact at a scale beyond the reach of solely 
non-profit distributing organisations. The panel’s focus on profit and purpose may be reassuring for 
those business leaders and investors who, on the one hand, are still wedded to many of the 
principles picked up on their MBAs, but whose lived experience increasingly indicates something 
rotten in the state of Denmark; something that requires more than CSR but does not discard those 
principles entirely.  
This appears to be the aim of the mission-led agenda. As we have set out above, it relies heavily on 
commercial incentives and many of those driving it are committed and successful capitalists, so 
nobody should be under any illusion that it is, at this point in time, setting up a blue-print for radical 
corporate reform. Yet, we are seeing something of a corporate movement,42 driven by progressive 
attitudes (as well as commercial - and political – pragmatism) that recognises that business as usual 
cannot be an option for corporate governance and practice in the twenty-first century.   
                                                          
38 Ibid., p. 3 
39 Ibid., p. 31 
40 Ibid., p. 15 
41 Ibid., p. 8 
42 N. Boeger, ‘The New Corporate Movement, in N. Boeger and C. Villiers (eds.), Changing the Corporate 
Landscape: towards corporate reform and enterprise diversity (Hart, 2018, in press)  
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Of course, the likelihood of this becoming realised in a manner which has significant impact depends 
on many factors. Not least among these will be the government’s response to the Review. The 
attitudes, too, of the various agents in the economy will also be critical and already, through the 
process of the Review, a range of opinions has emerged.43 There remains resistance to this agenda in 
several constituencies, as well as doubts as to whether the level of commitment that exists among 
proponents is sufficient to effect the necessary change. What has been rightly recognised as critical, 
by both the advisory panel and others,44 is the need for a range of complementary interventions, 
affecting the legal framework for businesses, but also in areas such as the investment industry, 
academia, advisory practice and accounting and reporting, to build the ecosystem in which 
companies which do seek to be purposeful may flourish. Changes to corporate governance will not 
succeed in isolation unless they are part of a wider package that embraces some, at least, of these 
matters also. The advisory panel makes ten recommendations covering a variety of areas, wisely 
recognising, in so doing, the importance of making many interventions across the system in order to 
effect change, rather than proffering a magic bullet.  
In discussing how these questions might be taken forward, it is acknowledged there are those who 
don’t believe such changes are necessary or desirable. Practical challenges have been identified by 
some, who see difficulties for directors and investors in taking decisions where the interests of 
multiple stakeholders have to be balanced, as opposed to enjoying the relative simplicity of pursuing 
the single goal of profit maximisation for shareholders.45 Others reject the need for (legal) 
intervention in principle and argue that corporations are free now to act as mission-led businesses in 
the manner defined by the advisory panel. They are permitted within current legislation to act in this 
way and those that wish to take advantage of this do so. The fact they are few in number is simply a 
product of market forces which should be respected and not interfered with. All businesses are 
mission-led; it is just that the mission of the vast majority is to optimise the profits they make for 
their shareholders. ‘Nothing to see here, move right along,’ is the dismissive tone. Despite these 
examples of scepticism, however, both the levels of engagement around the issue currently and the 
broad enthusiasm of the panel having conducted the review suggest there is value in addressing how 
the potential may translate in practice.   
6. Mission-led business and corporate legal form 
One may question whether mission-led business is a useful categorisation in legal terms, given many 
businesses that can legitimately describe themselves as mission-led already exist. Generally, they are 
recognised as social enterprises. They often take the form of community interest companies, 
community benefit societies and, increasingly, certain charities. A common feature to all is that both 
their mission and their assets are ‘locked in’ through a combination of their constitution and 
regulation. The mission for the first two has to be for the benefit of a defined community and the 
                                                          
43 Mission-led business consultation responses, available (in zip file) at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/mission-led-business-review-call-for-evidence  
44 E.g. Big Innovation Centre, The Purposeful Company Policy Report, above note 5  
45 There is an irony here, of course, in that company directors have been some of the best paid people over 
recent decades, their salaries justified in no small measure by the complexity of the decisions they have to 
take. Is the inference they may not be up to the job if it becomes more complicated, or is there an aversion to 
the further irony that part of that balancing of interests may mean reducing the gap between highest and 
lowest paid, so some may see pressure on their salaries, just at the time they may be asked to exercise their 
skills and judgment in more thoughtful and nuanced ways? 
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last has to be for public benefit and pass as a charitable purpose. The asset lock ensures that the 
assets of the company can only be applied for the intended purpose and not for private benefit. As 
such, they are regarded as not for profit organisations (although in practice the more successful do 
make surpluses, but reinvest them to further their mission). 
It is the asset lock that has proved problematic for some entrepreneurs, who may have a genuine 
intent to do good through business activity, but a reluctance to make the considerable personal 
commitment required to establish a successful business without the opportunity for commensurate 
financial reward. Often, currently, they use a traditional limited company form and rely on their own 
ability to control what the company does to adhere to that original mission. Sometimes this plays 
out in practice, but it can mean certain sources of finance, for example from social investors or 
charitable foundations, are unavailable to them due to concern with the potential scope for private 
benefit to arise. Problems can also emerge when the founder moves on, or other investors takes 
stakes in the entity, and that original benign intent becomes diluted, or forgotten, or overridden. 
Co-operatives and mutual societies offer another, distinctive, form of mission-led business.46 With a 
history stretching back to the mid-nineteenth century and an international movement boasting 
significant contemporary operations such as Mondragon in Spain, Cecosesola in Venezuela and The 
Phone Co-op in the UK, co-operatives provide reminders both that little is truly new in this world and 
also that alternative, mission-led approaches can be successful. The extent to which they are 
regarded as a niche sector of the economy, however, shows how far we have moved away from 
thinking of collaborative models of enterprise as a standard approach to business.  
In addition to these existing, but not widely adopted legal forms, it is possible under curent 
legislation to create a bespoke model which builds mission into the constitution of any company. 
This can be accomplished without also including an asset lock. It is anticipated as an option by 
section 172 (2) of the Companies Act 2006 (the Act)47 which contains the phrase, ‘where or to the 
extent that the purposes of the company consist of or include purposes other than the benefit of the 
members.’ Some companies have taken advantage of the flexibility this highlights, for example Big 
Society Capital, Social Stock Exchange and Social Finance. However, these are particular types of 
organisations, with a clear social purpose, whereas what the advisory panel, and the vast majority of 
active participants in the current debate around mission-led business, are focused on is more typical 
trading entities framing their decision making and activities by reference to their mission. Here, the 
question arises whether section 172 in its current form is suitable to offer enough flexibility to 
achieve this, though experience indicates the more relevant question is how may businesses be 
persuaded to use the flexibilities within the legislation, whether as currently drafted or amended in 
the future?  
At this point, it is worth pausing to reflect both upon how the wording of section 172 came into 
being and its impact in the subsequent decade.  In promoting the Act, the government was clear that 
the purpose behind the legislative provision was to codify the concept of ‘enlightened shareholder 
value’; that is, the interests of the members of the company having primacy, but there being a 
recognition that members may benefit from wider stakeholder interests being taken into account in 
                                                          
46 E. Mayo (ed.), The Co-operative Advantage: innovation, co-operation and why sharing business ownership is 
good for Britain (Cooperatives UK, 2015) 
47 Companies Act 2006, section 172, available at: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/section/172  
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the decision making of a company’s board. This was distinct from what was described in the 
parliamentary debates as the pluralist approach, which essentially argued for greater parity to be 
given to stakeholder and shareholder interests.48 
Since the introduction of the Act, there has been little discernible change in the attitudes or 
behaviours of company directors or companies.49 Pro forma company board minutes have been 
adapted to make reference to section 172, such that it is common to see statements in  minutes that 
are variants of ‘the board, having had regard to the matters outlined in section 172(1) of the 
Companies Act 2006, resolved …’. The duty to ‘promote the success of the Company for the benefit of 
its members as a whole’ has been taken to mean act in the interests of the shareholders, which in 
turn has been interpreted as maximise financial return for shareholders and scant evidence of 
enlightenment. 
There is a cultural aversion among many in the corporate world to regulation, and there is evidence 
that attempts to regulate can stimulate box ticking compliance behaviours. However, as the 
legislation has not had the effect of encouraging wider stakeholder-oriented corporate practice, it 
seems further steers are required to drive the desired approach. It may be that a distinction is 
appropriate to establish a baseline of engagement with the impact of a business’ activities on its 
stakeholders, which is the minimum expected of all companies, and a higher standard applying to 
self-declaring mission-led businesses who, in return for delivering to that higher standard, receive 
financial benefits (maybe in the form of tax reliefs or subsidies, to reflect the lower external costs 
their behaviours place on other parts of the economy or society). 
This would require a business judgement of the directors in each case, exercised in good faith and 
taken with the approval of the shareholders, but it would be one framed differently, with different 
expectations. This potentially addresses some of the concerns voiced during the parliamentary 
debate of the Act50 – that it should not be for parliament to dictate to directors how they should act 
– whilst providing the impetus to shift them towards an approach focused more on the purpose of 
the company than the narrow financial interests of its members and a recognition that whilst there 
is overlap, there is also a distinction between these two drivers. 
It is a moot point whether the lack of change in corporate practice following the Act was to any 
degree intended or not, but there is certainly a history of unintended consequences flowing from 
legislative attempts to shift behaviours, a relevant recent one here being the attempt to address 
escalating executive pay leading to the bonus culture which has made it yet more extravagant.51 
Hence, any attempt to introduce a new legal form for mission-led businesses would need to pay 
careful attention to the ongoing requirements on companies at large and not create any explicit or 
                                                          
48 See Hansard, House of Commons Debate 17 October 2006, volume 450, column 765, available at: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo061017/debindx/61017-x.htm  
49 See also G. Tsagas, ‘Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006: Desperate times call for soft law measures’, in 
N. Boeger and C. Villiers (eds.), Changing the Corporate Landscape: towards corporate reform and enterprise 
diversity (Hart, 2018, in press)  
50 See Hansard, House of Commons Debate 17 October 2006, volume 450, column 772, available at: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo061017/debindx/61017-x.htm  
51 The Cadbury Report (above note 14) recommended closer alignment between the performance of a 
company and executive pay. Over the years, this has led to increasing focus on the aspects of performance, 
particularly share price, which trigger bonuses for executives, exacerbating the issue Cadbury was attempting 
to address.  
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implicit expectation that the existing section 172 and related duties should be diluted or disregarded 
if a company was not formally a mission-led business. 
The lessons to be drawn from all this, we would suggest, are that leaving the legislation as it is will 
do nothing to change corporate practice, but legislative changes which are merely permissive are 
unlikely to drive the desired changes in corporate practice either. On the other hand, legislative 
changes which are directive will not have the desired effect in isolation, without other 
complementary changes being introduced to create a more supportive ecosystem in which mission-
led businesses may operate. Thus, we will consider some prospective legislative changes in the next 
section, before touching on other possible interventions that may assist. 
7. Some proposals on legal form 
Notwithstanding the existence of social enterprises and the handful of legal forms available to them, 
there appears to be a case for a new model to encourage and enable mission-led businesses to be 
easily identifiable and to have clarity around what is expected of them. This is not, at this point in 
time, about a requirement for all businesses to be mission-led. Instead, the approach may be for the 
time being to make it both easy and desirable for new and existing businesses to become 
recognisably mission-led. This might be achieved, in terms of convenience, by introducing simple 
changes to their constitution, governance and reporting arrangements; and, in terms of 
incentivisation, through tax reliefs, for the company itself and those that invest in it, at least in the 
initial stages. The aspiration would be that, over time, the number and profile of mission-led 
businesses would increase to the point at which the question became not ‘why become a mission-
led business?’ but ‘why not?’. 
Looking at the detail of the current statutory requirements for companies, we consider here some 
possible changes to differentiate mission-led businesses. In doing so, we reference the example of B 
Corps and their accreditation, which began in the United States in 2007 and reached the UK in 
2015.52 Broadly speaking, the accreditation process involves the company completing, at least every 
two years, a social impact assessment, and making certain changes to its constitutional documents 
to reflect its commitment to its wider stakeholders and the environment. The certification is issued 
by B Lab, an international non-profit organisation, and it also involves payment by the company of a 
fee to the organisation for its certification and assurance services.53  
The B Corp is by no means the only approach to mission-led business which exists, but the 
motivations of those in the movement appear to focus on the alignment of profit and purpose which 
is echoed by many of the advocates for mission-led business. As recognised by the advisory panel, 
the B Corp movement offers some lessons in terms of possible implementation approaches in a 
variety of respects. B Lab itself is also behind the introduction of the Benefit Corporation model, a 
legal form for profit-with-purpose organisations which exists now in 32 US States.54 A similar model 
                                                          
52 D. Hunter, ‘The Arrival of B Corps in Britain: another milestone towards a more nuanced economy?’, in N. 
Boeger and C. Villiers (eds.), Changing the Corporate Landscape: towards corporate reform and enterprise 
diversity (Hart Publishing forthcoming) 
53 B Corporation, at: www.bcorporation.uk  
54 Benefit Corporation, at: http://benefitcorp.net/; R. Alexander, Benefit Corporation Law and Governance: 
Pursuing Profit with Purpose (Berrett-Koehler, 2017) 
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also has been adopted in Italy in the form of the Societa Benefit, and is being actively considered in 
Argentina, Colombia and Australia.  
While these are useful examples, there is no need to adopt the Benefit Corporation nomenclature, 
and the underlying principles can be adapted to suit local circumstances. It may be that a new legal 
form in the UK could reflect some of those principles but, depending upon the emphasis that lay 
behind its introduction, it might be called, for example, a Stakeholder Company. The B Corp 
accreditation process provides practical lessons in terms of the impact of making changes to 
governance arrangements and in measuring performance of corporations in practice. In either case, 
it will be important to strike the optimal balance between establishing something meaningful in 
terms of quality assurance, without creating something that will deter all but the most ardent 
proponents. We have this balance in mind in considering questions of governance, purpose and 
reporting below. 
Directors’ duties 
In the UK, B Corps are expected to adhere to a form of words which closely follows, but provides 
clarification to, the current section 172 wording. The intent behind this was both to avoid 
discrepancies arising between internal constitutional commitments and external statutory ones, and 
to support the argument that this is consistent with what is currently permissible. There is scope to 
explore whether it goes far enough and whether, particularly given the lack of change in practice 
following the Act, such similar wording to section 172 would have a material impact this time 
around. The three main areas of contention we see here are discussed briefly below. 
The description of the interests of the company and its alignment with those of shareholders 
Section 172 requires a director to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole. This is finessed by B Corps with the addition of ‘through its business operations 
to have a material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole.’55 Whilst the 
additional wording is constructive, in terms of identifying a company explicitly as mission-led we 
question whether the association between success and member benefit should also be challenged. 
An alternative approach would focus not on shareholders or members, but on the long-term health 
of the company, which becomes management’s primary concern. In such an alternative ‘company-
centred’ model,56 the stated purpose of the company and how the interests described in section 172 
(1) have been taken into account offer new potential benchmarks against which to analyse the 
performance of the company. This would highlight the company directors’ role not as the agents of 
shareholders (or any other stakeholders), but as a fiduciary of the company’s best interests.57  
The relationship between shareholders and other stakeholders 
As currently stated, the Act requires directors to have regard to those matters listed in section 172 
(1), but in the context of the primary duty to promote the success of the company for the benefit of 
the members. The addition in the governance documents of B Corps is to state that a director ‘shall 
not be required to regard the benefit of any Stakeholder Interest or group of Stakeholder Interests 
                                                          
55 http://bcorporation.uk/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp-uk 
56 J. L. Bower, L. S. Paine, S. Cliff and D. Barton, ‘The Error at the Heart of Corporate Leadership’, Harvard 
Business Review, May-June 2017 (Managing in the Long-term), available at https://hbr.org/2017/05/managing-
for-the-long-term#the-error-at-the-heart-of-corporate-leadership 
57 Ibid.  
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as more important than any other’ (a Stakeholder Interest being any of the matters referred to in 
section 172 (1)).58 This however does not address the question of whether the interests of 
shareholders are to be treated as equivalent to any other stakeholder Interest, and so leaves their 
primacy intact. If the intent is to create a new category of Stakeholder Company (or similar), we 
argue this relationship must be challenged. It should be made explicit that the interests of all 
stakeholders are to be treated with equivalence, for example by amending the current section 172 
(1) (f) to read ‘the need to act fairly as between stakeholders of the company.’ 
The responsibility of directors for their actions 
To the best of our knowledge, no director has been found to be in breach of section 172. 
Notwithstanding this, the required drafting for B Corps includes the following provision for their 
articles of association: ‘Nothing in this Article express or implied, is intended to or shall create or 
grant any right or any cause of action to, by or for any person (other than the Company).’59 The 
intent here is evidently to give directors comfort that where they are entering into this new world of 
more nuanced decision making, balancing myriad stakeholder interests rather than simply having 
regard to them in the context of furthering shareholder interests, they will not inevitably be on the 
receiving end of a litigants’ jamboree. This is perhaps understandable, particularly in the context of 
an international movement sensitive to more litigious behaviours in other jurisdictions. The concern, 
however, is that if an equivalent provision were included in relation to all mission-led businesses, 
their directors may feel less inclined to behave consistently with the new requirements if there are 
no consequences for not doing so. Shareholders could bring claims, if this approach was followed, 
but the prospect of them doing so seems remote where the directors have acted more forcefully in 
their interests than might be technically be necessary. 
Overall, our view is that some remedies are required where directors act in breach of any new 
duties. These could distinguish between bad judgment and bad faith, but should be considered as 
part of the wider package of shifts to encourage mission focused corporate practice. One possible 
approach in this regard may be to adopt what in UK law is known as the Wednesbury reasonableness 
test that applies to those in public office.60  In other words, provided directors could demonstrate 
they had acted reasonably in the decision-making process, then they would not be regarded as being 
in breach of their duties to the company.  
In addition, the ability to challenge decisions could be restricted in ways similar to those that apply 
to judicial review to limit potential claims. This would in principle align with our approach suggested 
above, namely to re-frame the directors’ role as fiduciary managers of the company, rather than 
economic agents (for members of the company). Thus, standing would only be granted to those with 
sufficient interest in the matter to which the alleged breach relates.61 This would create the 
possibility of cases being brought where directors act unreasonably in balancing stakeholder 
interests in their decision making, but only by those who demonstrably have been adversely affected 
by their decisions. As with judicial review, it will be up to courts to interpret these tests further. 
Consideration would also have to be given to the access to information (such as board papers) 
                                                          
58 B Corporation, ‘How to Become a B Corp’, available at: http://bcorporation.uk/become-a-b-corp/how-to-
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59 Ibid.  
60 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1 
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applicable for stakeholders to enable them to assess whether directors have been acting reasonably 
and in line with the regulations, as currently the requirements on private companies are quite 
different to those for public bodies, and knowing what processes have been followed may need to 
be made easier to ascertain. 
A further option may be to endow the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) with enforcement powers 
where directors were found to be in breach of this duty, as it already has in respect of statutory 
auditors. This is something the UK government resisted introducing in its response to the 
consultation on Corporate Reforms (despite the FRC indicating they would welcome an increase in 
these powers themselves) but it remains a potential option. 
Statement of purpose 
This leads into whether it should be a requirement for a company purporting to be a mission-led 
business to state their mission and to report on their performance in delivering that mission. This 
can be approached in several ways, not just in terms of whether and how a purpose is stated, but 
how it relates to the objects of the company more broadly and the directors’ duties. 
For example, the purpose might relate specifically to the activities of the company and the markets it 
operates in, or it may be more generic (eg to have a material positive impact on society and the 
environment taken as a whole). The relationship between that purpose and its wider objects (eg 
promoting the success of the company - whether or not for the benefit of the members) may be 
specified, giving one primacy over the other, or stating both should carry equal weight. References 
to treatment of stakeholders or responsible business principles might also be introduced.  
Whilst mission statements may be associated with 20th century corporate culture and branding 
strategies (and trigger wariness as a result), our sense is that rather than trying to define to the nth 
degree what should or should not constitute a legitimate mission to be defined within a company’s 
constitution, robust reporting requirements related to the mission and also custom and practice may 
be more effective in identifying truly mission-led businesses and distinguishing them from the 
uncommitted. 
The Big Innovation Centre, in its Purposeful Company Policy Report, for example, appears 
unconcerned about a need to be prescriptive, recommending simply that companies should be 
required to make clear and precise statements of their purpose in their articles: new companies 
from the outset and existing companies by the end of a five-year transitional period.62 It would be 
significant to measure companies not just against their self-proclaimed mission, but the related 
impacts in delivering that mission. So that if, for example, a commercial bank was to make its 
mission ‘enabling people to own their own home’, any reference to mortgages granted may also 
need statistics presented alongside that, addressing matters like levels of repossession and arrears, 
numbers of buy to let mortgages granted and other metrics which might reveal the shadow side to 
that bank’s stated aim and the appropriateness, not merely the volume, of their lending practices. 
The B Corp movement does not require a specific purpose to be stated, opting instead for the 
commitment to take stakeholder interests into account, to have an overall positive effect on society 
and the environment and to the Declaration of Interdependence. The last contains a series of 
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statements of belief which are certainly distinct from what would be regarded as typical corporate 
practice today.63 The benefit of such a generic approach is that a consistency can be achieved across 
markets, providing a public statement of a particular modus operandi that can act as a reference 
point to measure against where corporate behaviour is clearly inconsistent with this. It does not 
offer a specific mission for a specific organisation, although one could be added to what the B Corp 
approach offers.  We regard a clear and specific statement of purpose potentially challenging, but 
desirable, especially when supported by good reporting (considered in the following section).  
Reporting 
The other related aspect of B Corp practice which is relevant, even critical, here is the bi-annual 
impact assessment. This measures the performance of B Corps against various criteria to ensure that 
they are sufficiently taking the social and environmental impact of their activities into account in 
decision making. It focuses on the various stakeholder interests, so is effective in casting light on 
how a business engages, for example, with its staff, customers and supply chain, and its relationship 
with the communities it operates in and its environmental impact. It is this, for example, that might 
expose a bank that earns poor customer feedback because it sells them products they don’t need or 
has opaque charging structures; or that has huge discrepancies in pay among the highest and lowest 
earners. Extending this approach to embrace reporting on a company’s stated purpose may enable 
further mission, or sector, specific analysis, such as whether there are any ethical considerations in 
the bank’s lending practices.    
The B Corp impact assessment is of course not directly part of a company’s routine reporting cycle: it 
is an additional process and part of the accreditation by B Lab.  Yet we see value in a similar, and 
similarly detailed, assessment to be embedded into the reporting requirements for mission-led 
businesses. We regard detailed reporting as critical to embed and illustrate best practice among 
mission-led business, giving substance to constitutional commitments to be mission led.  
Even in the mainstream, investors and financial markets are increasingly welcoming more 
sophisticated and integrated non-financial reporting; reflecting a move within capital markets from a 
single concern (financial), through multiple discrete concerns (financial, social, environmental), to 
integration of reporting on them all. Company legislation has been adjusted64 and supplemented by 
domestic and international guidance on integrated reporting,65 although the effectiveness of these 
changes remains a much-debated issue for both academics66 and practitioners.67 The advisory panel 
                                                          
63 B Corporation, ‘The B Corp Declaration’, available at: https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-
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for example observes that ‘the tools currently available tend to be burdensome, expensive and 
inaccurate, especially for smaller businesses.’68 
Nonetheless, at an event at Cass Business School in May 2017, Amelie Montchalin, Vice President for 
Policy and Foresight at AXA Group, spoke of the very significant and welcome change she was 
beginning to see in businesses moving away from reporting on the past to focusing on anticipating 
the future. This echoes the mantra of Canadian ice hockey legend, Wayne Gretsky, of ‘skating to 
where the puck is going’,69 and the Theory of U developed by Otto Scharmer of MIT, which describes 
a process by which organisations and individuals can ‘lead from the emerging future.’70 This is 
potentially consistent with the motivation to embrace a mission led approach to achieve commercial 
advantage. It also speaks to the sort of cultural shift (from ‘doing what we do because it is what we 
have always done’ to approaching heightened uncertainty with greater openness and flexibility) that 
may prove necessary not only for business success but societal flourishing in the coming years and 
decades.  
In addition to the legal requirement of a strategic report, the Act imposes specific reporting 
requirements on directors.71 For mission-led businesses, these could be revised, in consistent 
manner with any other changes, such that company boards are required more explicitly to report on 
a yearly basis on – depending upon the nature of the changes introduced and any discretion around 
the extent to which a company commits to being mission-led – how stakeholder interests have been 
taken into account in significant decision making; how the company has followed responsible 
business practices; and how it has delivered on its mission. In each case, this would be more 
powerful where this was not merely a record of actions, but also illustrated the impact such actions 
have achieved.  
8. Other interventions 
Businesses are part of an eco-system. There are multiple actors with the ability to influence how 
businesses behave and plenty of potential interventions to encourage and enable mission-led 
business. As previously indicated, the panel’s report contained ten recommendations proposing 
diverse interventions across this system in order to effect change. These ranged from the 
government’s role in encouraging mission-led business, to changing legal and governance 
frameworks, to ensuring that advisory firms commit to better serving these businesses. Our 
discussion thus far has focused on questions of legal form, but we also regard these other matters as 
integral to any reform process. In this section, we seek only to illustrate the variety of participants 
who might have a beneficial effect on establishing a culture of mission-led business; some examples 
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of what their interventions might look like; and why there is reason to be hopeful that some of 
these, at least, might positively influence future business practice.  
Financial markets 
The expectations of the financial markets is one of the most commonly cited inhibitors of businesses 
from adopting long (or even medium) term perspectives and assessing their wider impact on 
stakeholders. Yet increasingly, influential voices are advocating for change. Larry Fink, the CEO of 
BlackRock, which invests $3 trillion and manages a further $9 trillion, wrote in his 2017 new year 
letter to investors of the need for corporations to report more on their future strategy (rather than 
past performance), to resist pressure to focus on short term results, and of the debilitating effect of 
increasing inequality on economic performance.72 Andy Haldane, Chief Economist at the Bank of 
England has described how our current corporate practices mean firms are “almost eating 
themselves”73 and there are several movements and programmes actively engaging with the 
perceived challenges to the system, involving senior figures from some of the largest global 
corporations. The likes of Barclays and Kingfisher are involved in the Big Innovation Centre, running 
the Purposeful Company project, Mars are partnering Said Business School promoting the 
Responsible Business Forum, and Legal & General, McKinsey and Johnson & Johnson were all part of 
the advisory panel for the Review. Nor can it be argued that there is no appetite for investment in 
mission-led businesses since the IPO in February 2017 of Laureate Education, the first Benefit 
Corporation to list on a stock exchange, which raised $490million. 
There are similarities, both in terms of approach and effect, in current assumptions around directors’ 
responsibilities and investors’ fiduciary duties. Just as we see greater clarity being desirable in terms 
of directors’ responsibilities to stakeholders more widely, so we would propose a parallel move to 
make explicit (as mooted by the Kay Review in 2012) an extension of the concept of fiduciary duty 
beyond narrow financial optimisation.74 Again, this is consistent with positions being taken by 
respected actors in the sector, in this case the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) initiative 
and collaborators who, in their report Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century, state that ‘failing to 
consider long-term investment value drivers, which include environmental, social and governance 
issues, in investment practice is a failure of fiduciary duty.’75  
Specifically, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)76 requires investment advisers 
and managers to ensure that, when providing investment advice or discretionary portfolio 
management, investments are ‘suitable’ for clients. This is a fundamental regulatory requirement77. 
At the moment, suitability is often understood and interpreted by advisers and managers in purely 
                                                          
72 Blackrock, ‘Annual Letter to CEOs’, available at: https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/investor-
relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter  
73 Interview with Andy Haldane, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZmUlTuyRPd8  
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financial terms, whereas to comply with MiFID they should obtain information regarding a client’s 
investment objectives also. As such, they should be routinely asking:  
 whether the relevant client wishes to screen out investments which might have a negative 
social and/or environmental impact;  
 whether the client wants investments with a positive social and environmental impact; and  
 the relative importance of social and environmental impact as against other traditional 
financial factors, including return, risk and liquidity.  
The best investment advisers and managers already do this, just as there are companies that 
genuinely act responsibly and take stakeholder interests into account. However, custom and practice 
again leads the herd to follow the well-worn, limiting path. Addressing the misconceptions around 
‘suitability’ at the same time as clarifying directors’ duties under section 172 is an example of 
complementary interventions with the potential to shift perceptions and practice. 
Research and academia 
The advisory panel identified a role for ‘educators’ – including academia and the wider research 
community – in building support for mission-led businesses. They call especially on academics to 
contribute towards building more evidence that can help ‘challenge the idea that caring for society 
must come at the expense of profit.’78 While this is clearly one of the roles for researchers in this 
field, we regard their potential impact in this space as wider still. Alongside empirical work into the 
practical development of new business forms, including mission-led firms, academics and 
researchers, often collaborating with those in practice, have a key role to play, too, in generating in-
depth conceptual work on enterprise diversity and corporate reform, involving some necessary 
‘blue-sky’ thinking.79 How to teach business and entrepreneurship, management and law, and how 
to generate awareness of our respective fields of studies, is (and should be) subject to constant 
review and critical, sometimes radical, debates.80 This is a field also that lends itself to 
interdisciplinary collaboration especially in the field of management and organisation, business 
studies, economics and finance and law.81  
More importantly still, as indicated previously, issues of corporate governance and the underlying 
problems of capitalism are so closely connected that study of one usually necessitates at least 
engagement with the other. The relevant academic fields here go well beyond the relatively narrow 
schools of business, management and corporate law and governance. Recent critical academic works 
with high-impact - on the development of capitalism in the 21st century,82 on the entrepreneurial 
role of the state,83 and on the cost of social and economic inequality84 - all illustrate that these issues 
are connected as part of a broader picture. Far from acting as technical executors whose primary 
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role is to grow an evidence base in support of a business case for business with purpose, academic 
and wider conceptual (‘ideational’) research is necessary to generate the foundations for new modes 
of thinking about business and capitalism, in collaboration always with those in the policy and 
practical space.  
Professional advisors 
The cost of professional advice means that often clients seek out advisors who have a track record in 
a specialism and can advise on the current state of affairs. From the advisors’ perspective, their 
advice tends to reflect custom and practice (as well as what is compliant). This is not an environment 
which encourages creativity and innovation and if a company wishes to do something different, it 
can find the consensus among advisors discouraging. There are exceptions of course, but one of the 
benefits of legislative changes is that they push advisors to adapt to the new requirements. This is 
acknowledged in the Review, with its recommendation that ‘advisory firms commit to better-serving 
mission-led businesses through increased training and extending their pro bono remit.’85 A further 
step which would be likely to improve the quality of advice from such firms would be a commitment 
on their part to become mission-led themselves, so they advise from a position of empathy and 
experience and not purely as technicians. 
Executives and corporations 
Bill Torbert, author of Action Inquiry: The Secret of Timely and Transforming Leadership86, has 
identified a critical ingredient of good leadership as making oneself open to opportunity, so that 
when the moment arises, you are ready to step into it. It is not unreasonable to see this applying 
very well to those running businesses who may, to date, have claimed that investor expectations 
and/or management behaviours inhibit their ability to embrace a more mission-led approach, even 
though they personally see merit in it. As alignment occurs between policy and regulation, and 
market expectations, and public discourse (whether at large or within intermediary sectors such as 
advisors and academia), those running businesses need to be ready and willing to lead. The 
experience of those already behaving in this manner suggests key to this will be mission alignment – 
aligning the impact of the business with the interests of society – in a way that is clearly visible to 
and understood by their stakeholders. In turn, this will require diligent measuring of what matters, 
employing as much rigour as is devoted to financial management, as a means of building credibility 
and trust. The work of the social impact sub-group of GECES (the European Commission Expert 
Group on the social business initiative) provides an example of some of the more progressive 
thinking already taking place in this space.87 
The wider role of the state 
As the advisory panel recognised in its recommendations, there is a role for government in creating 
room for debate (as well as introducing legislation). It might take a variety of forms and, in this case, 
it would be desirable for them to be framed very much in terms of being deliberately ‘blue sky’ and 
‘thinking the unthinkable’, to encourage the sense that the debate itself is about embracing 
systemic, not cosmetic, change.  While on one level, it may generally ‘raise awareness and lead 
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conversations about the positive role that business plays’,88 it should also initiate more concrete 
changes, for example by ‘enabling blended finance investment models and social pension pots.’89 
This might mean, for example, that in terms of policy and regulation, there could be debates around 
matters such as: 
 Linking corporate behaviours to the licence to operate, so that extreme or persistent 
criminal performance means a business and the individuals behind it are barred from 
continuing to operate in the jurisdiction. 
 Imposing surcharges to reflect the cost of externalities on pure for-profit businesses, with 
relief from such surcharges being applied to mission-led businesses. 
 Linking pension fund performance to company performance so that dividends cannot be 
declared where deficits above certain levels exist in related pension pots. 
Though they are, of course, linked, part of the debate instigated by government would be as much 
focused on culture change as policy. This might build from questions such as: 
 What are the public purposes of corporations, such that they merit the gift of limited 
liability?  
 How might law and policy be structured so that super pay and super profits come to be seen 
as evidence of misalignment within an organisation’s governance, and so an indication of 
potential failure, rather than a measure of success? 
 Should formal linkages be required between a company’s performance and the UN 
Sustainable Development Goals? 
 What expectations are there on mission-led businesses with regard to approaches to 
taxation? 
Government may also look at how it behaves itself to encourage mission-led business, or be 
consistent with the behaviours it is advocating, for example through: 
 Taking the benefits deriving from a mission-led approach into account in public procurement 
evaluation. 
 Directing other spending decisions (such as subsidies) towards mission-led businesses where 
appropriate. 
 Applying the measures required of mission-led businesses to government practices (so, for 
example, if a B Corp model was adopted, applying the Impact Assessment to arms of the 
State and reporting on their performance publicly). 
9. Conclusion 
Despite its relatively low political and public profile, the Review highlights an issue attracting interest 
within government and beyond and one with potentially profound impact over time. There is 
rampant uncertainty around the economic, political and natural environments within which we and 
successive generations will live and work, but however they turn out, clinging to ‘business as usual’ 
does not feel a recipe for success. Instead, in the aftermath of Brexit, might the UK reposition itself 
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as a global leader in an emergent approach to mission-led business which it invites other nations to 
explore collaboratively with it? On an individual level, when automation, migration and the 
hollowing out of many industries and the communities that have grown up around them demand 
reassessment of our relationships with work and identity, might we engage with businesses – and 
they with us – in ways that fundamentally (re-)shape our society and culture in the twenty-first 
century, rather than risking the stratified societies common to the dystopias found in Orwell’s 1984, 
Atwood’s Oryx and Crake trilogy and Huxley’s Brave New World? 
One of the impacts of explicitly identifying the mission of any given business is that it stipulates how 
it will benefit people, whether as customers, employees or members of the wider community and, in 
doing so, re-humanises the organisation. It enables the space that a business operates within to be 
(to an increased degree) relational, rather than merely transactional. It is curious that humanising 
business may seem a radical proposal and that implementing it may seem such a challenge. But 
many now point to the danger of not following this path and of continuing to pursue ‘the separation 
of capitalism from humanism.’ At the end of this path, as Yuval Noah Harari points out, ‘you could 
have very sophisticated and advanced economies without any need to liberalise your political 
system or to give freedom to invest in the education and welfare of the masses’.90 
Different constituencies, as our discussion has highlighted, come to the debate on mission-led 
business with different and sometimes complex motivations. We have seen that commercial 
incentives and the business case for corporate purpose – ‘doing good to do well’ – is a strong if not 
the dominant narrative in the Review itself. Others, including the current government, appear to 
come to the debate on mission-led business with a political motivation to ameliorate capitalism and 
temper the self-destructive effects of its economic logic by imposing on businesses a greater social 
responsibility. Yet others, including many entrepreneurs (both social and otherwise) come with a 
wider motivation to re-think the possibilities of business. For many of them, the fulfilment of its 
purpose is primarily why a company exists. Making profits is an important element of what the 
company does to ensure its longevity and ability to continue delivering on its mission, but this is not 
its raison d'être. The distinction has been voiced, more than once, using the analogy that, just ‘as 
humans need to breathe, but breathing is not their purpose, so businesses need money, but making 
money is not their purpose’.91 This goes to the heart of the change in corporate outlook that is 
required and invites us to consider meaning, as individuals, organisations and society in a way which 
has been absent from the national debate for decades. This would seem to be where many social 
enterprises but also those in, and interested in, the B Corp movement are often coming from. 
Our discussion further highlights that these motivations matter. They shape how the mission-led 
business agenda will be taken forward and what difference it can make to our future as a society. 
Responses to government Green Papers are not typically matters for the general public. However, it 
is possible for every one of us to act in ways which demonstrate that how companies conduct 
themselves is something that matters to us, whether as customers or employees, in some cases as 
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investors, or as members of communities. This can influence politicians and corporate decision 
makers and pension fund managers, so none of us should assume we cannot affect how this unfolds. 
The greater the extent of engagement at all levels with the concept of businesses being mission-led, 
the more likely we are to find any shift going beyond being the latest CSR initiative. This may well 
ameliorate capitalism, although it may not prove sufficient to stave off the existential challenges 
capitalism faces given the planet’s limited resources. It should benefit those businesses which 
embrace it and, more importantly, contribute to wider positive cultural shifts in the relationships 
between businesses and the people they engage with and effect. 
If these principles are accepted, the question moves onto how this should be implemented. We have 
touched on questions of legal form in our discussion, and hope to see the detail around this and 
other interventions becoming the focus of attention in coming months. Our proposals suggest that 
there is room for a new legal form for mission-led businesses in the UK that could, but need not, 
follow the model of the Benefit Corporation, nor its nomenclature. This new model would set 
mission-led businesses apart from ordinary corporations because it would impose on directors the 
role of a fiduciary and formulate their duties accordingly. It would commit the company to a 
statement of purpose that is clear and specific and would be supported by formal reporting that 
included a regular assessment of the firm’s wider social impact.  If the prediction of the panel of all 
businesses having a mission that includes serving society and the environment by 2026 is to be 
realised, we would expect incentives to be necessary to ease the transition for many existing 
companies to adopt the mission-led approach, along with adoption of several of the ancillary 
initiatives referred to. The prize though, again as anticipated by the panel, is an economy and a 
society thriving in ways that will not be achievable without such a shift.  
 
